A DECADE-LONG CRY FOR HELP
ANSWERED: THE FCC LOWERS THE
RATES OF INTERSTATE PRISON
PHONE CALLS
Brittni Downs†

I.

INTRODUCTION

A criminal trial that culminates in a sentence of incarceration affects the
lives of many: not only the convicted individual, but also their families and
loved ones. Inmates have few mediums through which they communicate with
people outside of prison, one of which is the prison telephone system.1 Although this may seem convenient, there have been various pricing obstacles
over the years that have rendered the system problematic.2 A 2012 study from
the Government Accountability Office found that “the quality of the interaction between an inmate and family can positively affect an inmate’s behavior
in prison and aids an inmate’s success when returning to the community.”3
However, those familial contacts, along with their positive effects, are diminished when relatives are unable to afford the inflated rates of collect calls coming from prisons.4 For instance, Fannie McKnight, an elderly woman whose
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2 (Jim Mustin ed. 2003), available at http://commcns.org/1kau5pJ.
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See The Plain Dealer Editorial Bd., FCC Finally Tackling the Problem of Costly
(Feb.
13,
2013,
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Prison
Phone
Calls,
CLEVELAND.COM
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See In re Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Report and Order and Further
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son was incarcerated in the Orleans Parish Prison, had to make the heart
wrenching decision of terminating communication with her own child, because
she could not afford the hefty phone charges.5 Families have been forced to
“choose between keeping in touch with a relative behind bars and, in some
cases, putting food on the table,” a decision that no one should ever have to
make.6
In response to years of public outcry, The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) finally began to consider modifying the rules that control
interstate interexchange inmate calling services (“ICS”) through the December
2012 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”).7 Not only did the inflated
prices of prison phone calls negatively affect the inmates themselves, but they
were also a detriment to the many people who yearn to stay in contact with
their incarcerated loved ones.8 Due to the recognition of these negative effects,
the FCC implemented a lengthy voting process culminating on August 9th,
2013 with the enactment of brand new rules.9
This Note begins by detailing the history of how the issue of prison phone
call rates gained enough support to get the FCC’s attention. It starts by laying
out examples of previously unsuccessful attempts to resolve the issue through
the court system, and then discusses the story of Martha Wright, who spearheaded the creation of two petitions that the FCC referenced in making its
NPRM. After providing the historical background, this Note then discusses the
elements of prison phone calls, detailing how they are functionally operated
and what parties are involved in such operations. Next, the Note describes the
FCC’s decision-making process in its entirety. First, it explains the impressions
of various FCC Commissioners prior to undergoing the voting process. Then
the Note enumerates relevant portions of the NPRM itself and goes on to describe the FCC’s voting timeline. Next, the Note discusses the outcome of the
vote by describing the newly-selected rules. Then, the Note sets out the various
arguments for why the decision to lower the rates of prison phone calls was
necessary. The discussion begins with various policy arguments, and then adNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 13-113, WC Docket No. 12-375, ¶ 42 (Sept. 26,
2013) [hereinafter RIICS Report & Order].
5
Katy Reckdahl, State PSC Considers Lowering ‘Sinful’ Prison Phone Rates, THE
LENS (Nov. 15, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://commcns.org/1dGBxDs (“McKnight, 72, deposited
money into a phone account that was debited every time they talked. But because the perminute rates were so high, the account emptied faster than she could fill it up. ‘So I told my
son that he can’t call me anymore,’ she said.”).
6
Editorial, Costly Phone Calls for Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, at A22.
7
In re Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 27
F.C.C.R. 16,629, 16,629–30 (Dec. 28, 2012) [hereinafter RIICS Proposed Rulemaking].
8
See generally RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4.
9
See RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1-8.
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dresses the unjust enrichment, arbitrariness, and recent state trend arguments.
Lastly, the Note gives examples of foreseeable concerns that may arise given
the implementation of the new rules, as well as next steps for the FCC to take
in regards to such.
II.

HISTORY

For years, plaintiffs attempted to lower prison phone rates through the court
system, rather than the FCC.10 However, litigation proved to be unsuccessful.11
Advocates against the high rates for prison phone calls took an alternative approach, filing two petitions with the FCC, on behalf of Martha Wright, which
sought to lower the call rates.12 This section will illustrate the events that occurred leading up to the FCC’s recognition of the issues detailed in those petitions.
A. Unsuccessful Court Attempts
Lawsuits challenging the overly expensive phone-rates have been unsuccessful.13 In Daleure v. Kentucky, for example, the plaintiffs’ claims brought
under the Sherman Act were undermined by the filed rate doctrine.14 The filed
rate doctrine provides that “any entity that is required to file tariffs governing
the rates, terms, and conditions of service must adhere strictly to those

10 See, e.g., McGuire v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 988, 988 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (deciding a lawsuit filed by the recipients of prisoners’ collect telephone calls, where
the recipients challenged the excessive rates and surcharges on said calls); Miranda v. Michigan, 168 F. Supp. 2d 685, 685 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (hearing a challenge to the “excessive and
discriminatory surcharges and fees” in connection with inmate telephone calls); Daleure v.
Kentucky, 119 F. Supp. 2d 683, 687 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (noting that the “Plaintiffs can also
seek rate relief from the FCC, although to the best of this Court’s knowledge they have not
chosen to do so”).
11 See McGuire, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (dismissing plaintiff’s antitrust claims based
upon the 11th Amendment, state action doctrine, and the filed rate doctrine); see also Miranda, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (noting that although the plaintiffs had standing under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the state action doctrine and the filed rate doctrine barred their
claims); Daleure, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 689–90.
12 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,629-30, 16,634-35.
13 See John E. Dannenberg, Nationwide PLN Survey Examines Prison Phone Contracts,
Kickbacks, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, http://commcns.org/1dGAcfV (last updated Oct. 23,
2012).
14 Daleure v. Kentucky, 119 F. Supp. 2d 683, 690 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (“Recognizing the
application of the filed rate doctrine to this case has several ramifications. All Plaintiffs’
damages claims under the Sherman Act and Section 1983 are dismissed. Plaintiffs may,
however, still be entitled to some form of injunctive relief.”).
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terms.”15 The Daleure court explained that, pursuant to this doctrine, regulatory
bodies have required that telephone companies adhere to the already approved
rates.16
In McGuire vs. Ameritech Services, Inc., the plaintiffs raised an Equal Protection claim to attack prison phone-calls.17 In order for a claim to succeed on
the basis of an equal protection violation, the court must find that the state
treated “two groups of similarly situated people differently.”18 Plaintiffs argued
that people who receive higher priced calls from inmates are similarly situated
to those who do not receive calls from inmates. However, the Court held to the
contrary:
This Court agrees that because the status of inmates cannot be considered
similar to that of non-inmates, it necessarily follows that at those times when
Plaintiffs communicate via telephone with inmates, they cannot expect to be
treated in similar fashion as they and others expect to be treated at those times
when they communicate with non-inmates via telephone.19
A second ground for the McGuire plaintiffs’ opposition to prison phone call
rates was an alleged violation under section 1 of the Sherman Act.20 The plaintiffs argued that Ohio restricted trade by denying competition in the inmateinitiated phone call market.21 However, in rejecting that argument, the court
applied the state action doctrine, which establishes that monopolistic actions of
independent states are exempt from antitrust attack, in declaring that “[a]n otherwise monopolistic restraint of trade will not give rise to a Sherman Act violation where it stems from a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy.”22
A final example illustrating an unsuccessful court challenge is Miranda v.
Michigan.23 In Miranda v. Michigan, the plaintiffs contested prison phone rates
by alleging a violation under section 201(b) of the Federal Telecommunica15 Request for Public Comment, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,902, 28,905, Comments of U.S. Telecom Assoc. (Antitrust Modernization Comm’n May 19, 2005), available at
http://commcns.org/1kayfhj.
16 Daleure, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 689.
17 McGuire, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
18 Daleure, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
19 McGuire, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
20 Id. at 993. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, “Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” Sherman Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
21 McGuire, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 993, 1006.
22 Id. at 1006. More specifically, the Supreme Court has refused to construe the Sherman Act as intending to “restrain state action or official action directed by a state.” Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).
23 See generally Miranda v. Michigan, 168 F. Supp. 2d 685 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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tions Act.24 Section 201(b) states that telephone call rates “shall be just and
reasonable” and any rate that is “unjust or unreasonable” is unlawful.25 The
Miranda court dismissed the plaintiffs’ section 201(b) argument against Michigan, because Michigan was not a “common carrier” and was, therefore, outside the purview of section 201(b).26 Further, the Miranda court dismissed
plaintiffs’ section 201(b) claim against the telephone companies, because of
the filed rate doctrine and because the FCC had primary jurisdiction over inmate calling services.27
B. Martha Wright
Ulandis Forte, convicted of manslaughter in 1994, was initially incarcerated
in a prison facility located in Lorton, Virginia.28 Forte was later transferred to
an Arizona prison in 1998, and then to the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 2001.29
Martha Wright, Forte’s grandmother and a Washington D.C. resident, was able
to visit with Forte weekly while he was incarcerated at Lorton. 30 Upon his
transfer however, Wright became disconcerted that she was paying approximately $200 per month in order to communicate with her incarcerated grandson by telephone.31 According to Wright, prior to her grandson’s relocation,
she had only been paying roughly $50 a month to receive phone calls from him
while at Lorton.32 Overall, Wright “estimates that she spent almost $1,000 per
year on phone calls limited to 15 minutes or less.”33 Wright had no other choice
but to communicate with her grandson by phone, because she was blind and
eighty-years-old.34 Being blind made it even more important that rates were

Id. at 692.
47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
26 Id. at 692–93. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952) (The
primary jurisdiction doctrine explains that, “in cases raising issues of fact not within the
conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed
over.”).
27 Miranda v. Michigan, 168 F. Supp. 2d 685, 692–93 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
28 Matthew Fleischer, Will ‘Middle of Nowhere’ Convince the FCC to Do the Wright
Thing on Prison Phone Rates?, TAKEPART (Sept. 21, 2012), http://commcns.org/KVIl9P.
29 Justin Moyer, After Almost a Decade, FCC Has Yet to Rule on High Cost of Prison
Phone Calls, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2012), http://commcns.org/1eMEVyS.
30 Id.
31 Suzanne Choney, FCC: Prison Phone Rates Far Too High, NBC NEWS (Jan. 3,
2013), http://commcns.org/19ZMhl2.
32 Moyer, supra note 29.
33 Id.
34 Ugonna Okpalaoka, Families Fight the Cost of Prison Phone Calls, THE GRIO (Sept.
28, 2012), http://commcns.org/1ey0Ysy.
24
25

136

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 22

affordable for Wright, since communicating via written letters was not an option for Wright and her grandson.35 Forte said, “[m]y grandmother has been
blind for 17 years. How was I supposed to write to her? She needed to hire
someone just to read the letters. When I called, we could only afford 2-3
minutes.”36
In February of 2000, inmates, family members, legal counsel, and other recipients of telephone calls from inmates at prison facilities operated by the
Corrections Corporation of America, Inc. (“CCA”) filed a class action suit to
challenge the rates and terms of long-distance telephone calls.37 The suit alleged several violations including, but not limited to, the infringement of their
rights to due process, equal protection, free speech and association, and freedom of contract.38 Despite these attempts, however, and in keeping with the
rationale described above in Miranda v. Michigan, District Judge Gladys Kessler dismissed the complaint and referred the case to the FCC on primary jurisdiction grounds.39 Mediation between the parties took place over the next two
years but unfortunately no compromise was reached.40 As a result, on November 3, 2003, petitioners filed the first “Wright Petition” as a request for rulemaking with the FCC.41 The request asked the FCC to “prohibit exclusive inmate calling service agreements and collect call-only restrictions at privatelyadministered prisons and require such facilities to permit multiple long distance carriers to interconnect with prison telephone systems.”42 Subsequently,
in March 2007, the petitioners filed the “Alternative Wright Petition,” requesting a debit calling requirement, rate-caps, and a prohibition against per-call
charges.43
Tens of thousands of individuals contacted the FCC, urging it to act on the
two Wright petitions and lower inmate phone call rates. 44 Many advocates
formed or joined campaigns for a cap on prison phone-call rates,45 such as the
35 Brooks Boliek, FCC Could Cut Inmates’ Phone Rates, PARTICIPANT MEDIA (Sept. 24,
2012), http://commcns.org/1m0zlez.
36 Amalia Deloney, Let’s Make History. FCC, Make It (W)right to Call Home!, CENTER
FOR MEDIA JUST. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://commcns.org/KcSkq3 (quoting testimony of
Ulandis Forte before the FCC).
37 Wright v. Corrections Corp. of Am., Civil Action No. 00-293 (GK), at 1 (D.D.C. Oct.
7, 2003).
38 Martha Wright v. Corrections Corp. of Am., CENTER FOR CONST. RTS.,
http://commcns.org/1cifAjR (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,634.
42 Id. at 16,629 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 Id. at 16,660 (statement of Comm’r Clyburn).
45 See, e.g., Middle of Nowhere’s Campaign for Prison Phone Justice, TAKE PART,
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Campaign for Prison Phone Justice.46 This Prison Phone Justice campaign garnered support from numerous organizations including the Center for Media
Justice, Prisoners and Families for Equal Rights & Justice, Prison Action Network, and the Human Rights Defense Center.47 After ten years of petitioning,
campaigning, and protesting, the advocates for a phone-rate cap finally got the
FCC’s to address the issue.48 The process that the FCC took in deciding which
of the proposed rules to implement will be discussed later in this Note.49
III.

ELEMENTS OF PRISON PHONE CALLS

In a large number of states, certain telephone companies offer profitable
commissions to state contracting agencies in return for monopolistic contracts
in that state’s prison phone services.50 In the inmate calling services industry,
the providers compete fiercely for the contracts to provide services to correctional facilities.51 Once the provider acquires the contract, that successful provider has a monopolistic hold over the inmate calling services at that facility.52
The inflated rates that the telephone companies decide to impose not only produce a profit for the telephone companies themselves, but must also account
for the commission payments charged by state agencies.53 On average, these
http://commcns.org/KVISbG (last visited Aug. 31, 2013); The Campaign for Prison Phone
Justice: Who We Are, NATION INSIDE, http://commcns.org/1c77cNk (last visited Aug. 31,
2013).
46 The Campaign for Prison Phone Justice: Lowering the Cost of and Ending Kickbacks
on Prison Phone Calls, MAG-NET BLOG, http://commcns.org/1ey17fQ (last visited Aug. 31,
2013).
47 NATION INSIDE, supra note 45.
48 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,629-30 (The FCC has noted the
increased attention:
[T]here has been substantial renewed interest and comment in this
docket highlighting both the wide disparity among interstate interexchange ICS rate levels and significant public interest concerns. We believe it is appropriate to seek comment to refresh the record and consider whether changes to our rules are necessary to ensure just and reasonable ICS rates for interstate, long distance calling at publicly- and privately-administered correctional facilities.).
49 See discussion infra Part IV.
50 Dannenberg, supra note 13 (Dannenberg observes that “[p]rison phone service providers are free to bid on contracts at the maximum rates allowed by regulatory agencies, and
upon winning such bids are effectively granted a monopoly on phone services within a given prison or jail system.”).
51 Choney, supra note 31.
52 Id.
53 Dannenberg, supra note 13. See also DREW KUKOROWSKI, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE,
THE PRICE TO CALL HOME: STATE-SANCTIONED MONOPOLIZATION IN THE PRISON PHONE
INDUSTRY 3 (2012), available at http://commcns.org/1eycXIW.
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commissions amount to approximately 42% of gross revenues, which is an
indication that the prison phone call industry is estimated to gross $362 million
or more annually.54
There are a variety of security considerations to which phone companies attempt to attribute the heightened cost of prison phone calls.55 Examples of such
security considerations include: an automated voice processing system, blocking mechanisms so that inmates are not able to make restricted calls, listening
and recording capabilities, and voice overlay features that allow for the identification of the call as coming from a correctional facility.56 However, because
those features are considered to be standard in prisons, the counter argument is
that the price inflation can only truly be due to other factors such as increases
in the commission payments,57 or profits the phone companies and the contracting agencies are trying to make off of the inflated rate.58 In fact, in New York,
where commission payments have been banned, the charge for local, intrastate,
and interstate prison phone calls is a mere $0.05 per minute, which includes the
costs for the aforementioned security considerations.59
Typically, a contracting agency issues a request for proposal (“RFP”), 60
which begins a bidding process for providers of phone services. 61 The RFP
specifies “the number of phones, locations and technical performance standards required by the contracting agency.”62 From the RFP, phone companies
can determine what their cost exposure will be when bidding for contracts, but
they also need to consider the kickbacks to the contracting agencies. 63 The
three major companies that primarily control prison phone contracts are: Global Tel*Link (“GTL”), which is the largest; Securus Technologies; and CenturyLink.64 According to The Prison Policy Initiative, “90 percent of the nation’s
prisoners make calls through three companies.”65 Once these contracts are secured, the types of calling methods available to inmates are either collect calls
Dannenberg, supra note 13.
RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,632; Cecelia Kang, FCC to Vote on
Lowering
Prison
Phone
Call
Costs,
WASH. POST
(Aug.
9,
2013),
http://commcns.org/1dGAJyp.
56 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,629.
57 Moyer, supra note 29; KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 5.
58 Dannenberg, supra note 13.
59 Over 60 Organizations File Joint Letter with FCC Urging Cap on Exorbitant Prison
Phone Rates, NATION INSIDE, http://commcns.org/1aSk5v3 (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
60 See Dannenberg, supra note 13.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2; see also Aaron Smith, FCC Votes to Reduce Rates
for Prison Phone Calls, CNNMONEY (Aug. 9, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fnvE50.
65 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2.
54
55
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or debit-based calls.66 Collect calls, paid by the receiver of the phone call, incur
a “per-call set up charge” as well as a “per-minute charge,” while debit-based
calling deducts funds from an inmate’s account by a per-minute charge only.67
Per-call charges range anywhere from $0.50 to $3.95, and per-minute charges
from $0.05 to $0.89.68
IV.

THE FCC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

A. Outlooks of the Commissioners Prior to Voting
As previously discussed, the December 2012 NPRM was the start of the
FCC’s direct action in response to the decade of public outcry pleading for
lower prison phone call rates.69 FCC Commissioners were ready and willing to
take on the task of figuring out the most appropriate direction to take in proposing new rules. 70 When addressing why the public should care, Acting
Chairwoman Mignon Clyburn stated that “[m]aintaining contact with family
and friends during incarceration not only helps the inmate, but it is beneficial
to our society as a whole.” 71 Similarly, Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel
stated, “[t]his is not just an issue of markets and rates; it is a broader issue of
social justice,” and that “[w]hen a single phone call may cost as much as a
month of unlimited phone service, the financial burden of staying in touch may
be too much for inmates’ families to bear.” 72 Commissioner Ajit Pai, while
acknowledging that he would consider possibilities for lowering prison phone
call rates, noted that “choice and competition are not hallmarks of life behind
bars.”73 Regardless, the decision to open a rulemaking was a unanimous one.74
B. The December 2012 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
66
67
68
69
70
71

burn).

RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16,629.
Choney, supra note 31.
RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,660 (statement of Comm’r Cly-

Id. at 16,661 (statement of Comm’r Rosenworcel).
Id. at 16,662 (statement of Comm’r Pai).
74 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Energy & Commerce Comm. of Democrats, Rep. Waxman Statement on FCC Proposal to Lower Prison Phone Rates (Dec. 28,
2012), available at http://commcns.org/1m0zyhN; see also Paul Barbagallo, FCC Proposes
Cap on Prison Phone Rates, Explores Two Companies’ Market Dominance, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Jan. 2, 2013), http://commcns.org/1abXHA3.
72
73
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This section outlines some relevant portions of the NPRM that outline exactly what the Wright petitioners were asking for. The FCC requested comments,
information, and answers in response to the NPRM from the public, specifically “state departments of corrections and state officials responsible for prison
telecommunications decision making.”75 The FCC sought these comments to
help it determine if the then-existing rates were just and reasonable and, if not,
how those goals could be achieved.76
1. How Much to Charge?
The petitioners requested a rate cap of $0.20 per minute for debit calling and
$0.25 per minute for collect calling, for interstate long distance inmate calling
services.77 The FCC sought comment on the elements of rate caps in general,
and the appropriate criteria to use in determining a particular rate cap.78 More
specifically, the FCC requested comment on their reasonableness.79 The FCC
wanted to know what factors should determine the per-minute rate caps,
whether the caps should be applied to both public and private institutions, and
if there are other rate cap options available besides the per-minute rate cap.80
The FCC wished to gather any opinions on proper implementation of the perminute rate caps and any foreseeable benefits or consequences resulting from
such implementation.81 The petitioners also proposed that all per-call charges
be terminated and replaced solely by per-minute charges.82 The FCC sought
comment regarding the exact costs that are associated with per-call charges,
and whether the elimination of such charges would result in reasonable rates.83
The FCC intended to gather information on dropped calls since inmates may
incur a second charge upon redial. 84 Petitioners suggested that this second
charge be voided as long as a dropped call is reinitiated within two minutes of

RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,635.
Id. at 16,636.
77 Id. at 16,635.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 16,630–33.
80 Id. at 16,637–38.
81 Id.
82 In re Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Petitioners’ Alternative Rulemaking Proposal, CC Docket No. 96-128, at 5 (Mar. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions].
83 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,637.
84 Id.
75
76
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the drop.85
ICS providers use Marginal Location Methodology to calculate proposed
ICS rates.86 Using this methodology, telephone service providers argued that
per-call charges are necessary in order to continue funding “equipment costs
and monthly line charges.”87 For debit calls, the implementation of this methodology yields a fixed $1.56 per-call charge in conjunction with an additional
$0.06 charge per minute.88 Collect calls yield a fixed charge of $2.49 per-call
and $0.07 per minute.89 Similar to the per-minute rate cap inquiries, the FCC
sought comment in regards to the reasonableness of this methodology in hopes
of discovering whether or not alternative methodologies should be used.90
There are also several issues surrounding commissions on which the FCC
wanted clarification.91 Commissions from ICS providers are sometimes used to
fund inmate services, and the FCC sought comment on what specific inmate
services these commissions fund.92 The FCC also requested responses to the
petitioners’ argument that rates are unreasonable under Section 201(b) of the
Communications Act. 93 Pursuant to this charge, the Commission wanted to
know “how much these site commissions are and how much they add to percall costs.”94 Lastly, the FCC sought comment on how a state’s decision to reduce or eliminate commissions affects the rates and the ICS market.95 The FCC
sought evidence as to a correlation between decreased rates and increased call
volume to determine whether ICS-rate reductions encourage greater communication between inmates and families.96
2. Method of Charging
The only two methods of charging for prison phone calls are collect calls
and debit calls, and the NPRM describes a collect call as “a call in which the
called person pays for the call,” whereas a “debit call deducts the cost of the

85

Id.
Id. at 16,638–39.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 16,639.
91 Id. at 16,642.
92 Id. at 16,642–43.
93 Id. at 16,642–43; see also Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions, supra note 82, at 22–23.
94 Id. at 16,642–43.
95 Id. at 16,643.
96 Id. at 16,639.
86
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call from a prepaid account.”97 The FCC requested information about setting
different rate-caps for debit and collect calling.98 Hinting at the implementation
of more debit calling systems following public comment, the FCC’s questions
primarily surrounded debit calling. 99 The FCC wanted to determine exactly
how many facilities already implement debit calling, and how the safety concerns that accompany the implementation of debit calling have been handled at
those facilities.100 In addition, the FCC solicited public comment on whether
prepaid calling should replace both collect calling and debit calling, as previous commenters have suggested.101 Prepaid calling differs from debit calling
because it allows families to purchase minutes in advance, as opposed to deducting money from the inmate’s account.102
Petitioners in the First Wright Petition also requested that the market for ICS
calls be opened up to competition, which, in turn, would “prohibit collect call
only restrictions in privately-administered correctional facilities.”103 The FCC
sought comments from the public in order to figure out how these exclusive
contracts affect ICS rates, and how opening up the market to competition could
procedurally be accomplished.104 Also, the FCC needed clarification regarding
the rationale behind the collect-calling restriction because petitioners in the
First Wright Petition argued that the inflated costs are “not outweighed by corresponding benefits.”105
3. Other Features
In the Alternative Wright Petition, petitioners suggested that inmates should
receive a certain number of “no-cost” calls each month, in exchange for phone
company discretion to increase the per-minute rate cost of such calls.106 Specifically, petitioners proposed that if caps of $0.275 per minute for collect calling
and $0.22 per minute for debit calling occur, then phone companies should be
required to give each inmate 20 minutes of free calling per month.107 The FCC
solicited public comment about the proposal generally and whether or not legal

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 16,640.
Id. at 16,643.
Id. at 16,640–41.
Id.
Id. at 16,641.
Id.
Id. at 16,642.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16,643.
Id.
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issues arise with the implementation of this type of system.108
In addition, the FCC also sought comment regarding Billing-Related Call
Blocking, which involves ICS providers whom are either unwilling or unable
to reach agreements with Local Exchange Carriers (“LECs”) in providing billing services to customers who receive collect calls from prisons.109 Due to this
failure or unwillingness, those companies block calls that go out to customers
of LECs in locales where billing agreements have yet to be reached.110 Petitioners argue that implementation of debit calling will avoid the necessity to block
calls.111 The FCC sought comments from the public to clarify the accuracy of
that argument, they sought information on how many calls are actually blocked
on a monthly basis, and if there are any ways other than debit calling where
billing-related call blocking can be prevented.112
Lastly, it has been suggested that calls made by inmates with hearing disabilities via teletypewriter equipment technologies (“TTY”) are four times longer than calls made via telephone from inmates without disabilities.113 Therefore,
inmates with hearing disabilities, as well as their families, have to pay even
more than their “hearing counterparts.”114 For example, the family of a deaf
person incarcerated in Maryland paid $20.40 for a call placed via Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS), a type of TTY telephone service, that lasted a
mere nine minutes.115 In addition, the record shows that TTY phone calls are
accompanied by yet another fee for having to connect to the TTY operator.116
The FCC sought comment to determine whether inmates with hearing disabilities really are paying more for ICS services, and, if so, for what reasons.117
The Commission also drew attention to Section 276(b)(1)(A),118 which exempts
hearing-disabled TTY calls from the Commission’s “per call compensation
plan,” seeking comment regarding how this exemption will affect the examination of rates for disability inmates.119
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Id.
Id. at 16,643–44.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 16,644–45.
114 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,644-45.
115 RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 3; Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS),
FCC, http://commcns.org/1ehNyTV (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
116 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,644–45.
117 Id.
118 Id. (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 276(b)(1)(A), 47 U.S.C. §
276(b)(1)(A) (2006)).
119 Id.
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C. The Voting Process
1. Legal Framework
The FCC not only sought public comment relating to the issues and inquiries present in the NPRM described above, but it is also sought comment on its
ability to exercise authority under the relevant laws: Section 276 of the Communications Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), specifically section 276(b)(1)(A),
as well as section 201(b).120 Section 276(b)(1)(A) governs the Commission’s
regulation of payphone services, detailing specifically how to proscribe regulations that promote competition among payphone service providers:
Establish a per call compensation plan to ensure that all payphone service
providers are fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate and
interstate call using their payphone, except that emergency calls and telecommunications relay service calls for hearing disabled individuals shall not be
subject to such compensation.121
The FCC sought comment to establish the extent of its authority to address
ICS matters under this section of the 1934 Act.122 Similarly, the FCC sought the
same insight with regard to its authority to regulate ICS under section 201(b)
of the 1934 Act, which states that “[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and
regulations for and in connection with such communication service, shall be
just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation
that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful.”123 The new rules will
only apply to interstate ICS rates since states have regulatory power over calls
within their own state.124 However, the FCC requested comment on ways to
encourage states to also reconsider their intrastate ICS rates.125
2. Voting Timeline
Having released the NPRM in December 2012, the FCC accepted public
comment until March 25, 2013.126 Commenters were permitted to submit reply
Id. at 16,647.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 276(b)(1)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A) (2006).
122 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,647.
123 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,647; § 201(b).
124 Trish Anderton, High Price of Prison Phone Calls Gets Attention from FCC, GIMBY
BLOG (Jan. 25, 2013), http://commcns.org/1ddtVMc.
125 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,647.
126 Comment Cycle Established For Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Public Notice, DA 13-79, WC Docket
No. 12-375 (Jan. 22, 2013).
120
121
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comments in response to those submitted before the March deadline until April
22, 2013.127 To facilitate the decision-making process, the FCC conducted a
day-long workshop on July 10, 2013 to discuss public policy implications, how
individual states have handled rate reform thus far, possible implementation
procedures, amongst other things.128 On August 9, 2013 the FCC Commissioners voted on the new rules, releasing an official Order (“the Order”) detailing
the rules on September 26, 2013.129 The rules go into effect 90 days after their
publication in the Federal Register.130
V.

THE FINAL DECISION

In implementing these new rules, the FCC “took long-overdue steps to ensure that the rates for interstate long-distance calls made by prison inmates are
just, reasonable and fair.”131 The Commission adopted the Order, which strikes
a balance between addressing security concerns, ensuring fair compensation
for service providers, while also keeping the rates reasonable for consumers.132
The FCC is now requiring that prison phone call rates be based solely on the
cost of providing the service.133 Therefore, correctional facilities are no longer
permitted to accept commission payments from phone companies, factoring
the amount of commission into the decision of which company will obtain a
contract.134 The Order adopted rate caps for both debit/pre-paid calls and collect calls, imposing a rate of no more than $0.21 and $0.25 per minute respectively.135 With these rates, debit and pre-paid calls can be no more than $3.15
for a 15-minute call, and collect calls can be no more than $3.75. If any company wishes to charge in excess of the rate caps, a request for a waiver showing good cause has to be filed and granted.136 Despite implementing the cap, the
FCC goes on to suggest that $0.12 and $0.14 are the truly “just, reasonable and

127

Id.
See FCC Provides Further Details On Agenda For July 10 Workshop On Inmate Calling Services, Public Notice, DA 13-1518, WC Docket No. 12-375 (July 3, 2013).
129 See generally RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4.
130 FCC Votes to Cap, Slash Prison Phone Rates, OMAHA.COM (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://commcns.org/1b6XjmS.
131 FCC Bars High Rates For Long Distance Phone Calls in Jails and Prisons Nationwide, FCC (Aug. 9, 2013), http://commcns.org/1j0ulcG.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.; Inmate Telephone Systems for Alaska Correctional Institutions, Alaska RFP
2008-2000-7549, at 1 (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://commcns.org/1ey2gUu.
135 FCC Bars High Rates For Long Distance Phone Calls in Jails and Prisons Nationwide, FCC (Aug, 9, 2013), http://commcns.org/1j0ulcG.
136 FCC Votes to Cap, Slash Prison Phone Rates, supra note 130.
128
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cost-based” rates for debit/prepaid and collect calling respectively. 137 Therefore, any company that charges at or below that standard will be exempt from
enforcement actions under the Order.138 The aforementioned rates still will allow prison facilities to implement various security precautions such as callblocking, call verification, recording systems, and restrictions on three-way
calling and forwarding.139 The FCC also clarified that users with hearing and
speech disabilities may not be charged higher rates.140 Lastly, the FCC has implemented requirements mandating data collection, annual certification, and
the enforcement of other provisions that will ensure that the Order is complied
with.141 The Order was decided upon in a 2-1 vote, with Acting Chairwoman
Clyburn and Commissioner Rosenworcel in favor of the Order and Commissioner Pai dissenting.142 Ulandis Forte, Martha Wright’s grandson, sat in the
audience as Chairwoman Clyburn and Commissioner Rosenworcel delivered
the results of the vote.143 Overcome with emotion, “[h]e wiped tears from his
eyes when the vote was taken.”144
VI.

THE FCC’S DECISION TO LOWER RATES WAS
IMPERATIVE

There are a myriad of arguments in support of the FCC’s decision to lower
prison phone call rates. As a policy matter, rates should have been lowered
because it will alleviate a heavy economic burden from the families of inmates, 145 facilitate continued relationships between incarcerated parents and
their children,146 and reduce recidivism rates and negative prison behaviors.147

137 FCC Bars High Rates For Long Distance Phone Calls in Jails and Prisons Nationwide, FCC (Aug, 9, 2013), http://commcns.org/1j0ulcG.
138 FCC Votes to Cap, Slash Prison Phone Rates, supra note 130.
139 FCC Bars High Rates For Long Distance Phone Calls in Jails and Prisons Nationwide, supra note 137.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 FCC Votes to Cap, Slash Prison Phone Rates, supra note 130.
144 Id.
145 See Choney, supra note 31.
146 Nekima Levy-Pounds, Children of Incarcerated Parents: Silent Victims of Prison
Phone Injustice, MAG-NET BLOG (June 22, 2012), http://commcns.org/1e97UAf.
147 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 5; see also Stan Donaldson, FCC Considers Limiting
Costs of Long-Distance Calls for Families of Prisoners in Ohio, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 12,
2013), http://commcns.org/1nnEjWo (quoting FCC Commissioner Clyburn discussing
phone contact and recidivism rates); see also Choney, supra note 31; N.Y. Prisons Make
Millions Profiteering on Inmate Phone Calls, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (Dec. 6,
2006), http://commcns.org/1ddvRVh.
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In addition to the policy arguments, the FCC made the right decision in lowering the rates because high rates not only unjustly enrich telephone companies
and state agencies,148 but are also arbitrary in nature.149 Lastly, the FCC should
have felt compelled to regulate the rates because there was already trend
emerging among states to implement lower rates.150
A. General Societal Policy Arguments
1. Decreasing the Burden on Family Members
Not only do the high costs of prison phone calls negatively affect the inmate,
but they also cost their families and loved ones millions of dollars every
year.151 This is especially true in situations where the inmate is using collect
calling services to contact their loved ones because, unlike debit calling where
the charges are deducted from the inmate’s personal account, with collect calling, the charges stemming from the prison phone call are paid directly by the
family.152 Often times, prisons are located hundreds of miles away from an inmate’s hometown.153 Therefore, low-income families suffer the most; since
they cannot afford to travel, phone communication is often their only option.154
This puts families in extremely compromising positions because they have to
choose between spending their already limited funds on unnecessarily exorbitant phone call rates, and simply not speaking to their incarcerated loved ones
at all.155 Grappling between the desire to answer phone calls from incarcerated
family members, and the lack of funds to support the costs of such phone calls,
families have suffered the unfortunate consequence of losing their telephone
service due to unpaid phone bills.156 Similarly, some families “had . . . been
evicted from their apartments,” while “ [o]thers took second jobs merely to
afford the cost of the collect calls coming from prison.”157 Civil liberties advoDannenberg, supra note 13. See generally RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4.
Dannenberg, supra note 13.
150 Choney, supra note 31. See also Dannenberg, supra note 13.
151 See RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 1.
152 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,640.
153 Donaldson, supra note 147.
154 Id.
155 Letter from Paul Wright, Exec. Director, Human Rights Defense Center, to Marlene
H. Dorstch, Secretary, FCC, Joint Ex Parte Comment for CC Docket No. 96-128 (“Wright
Petition”) at ¶ 8 (on file with author) (“In short, high prison phone rates are a form of price
gouging that mainly affects prisoners’ family members – who have no other option but to
pay the rates if they want to hear the voice of their incarcerated loved one, due to the monopolistic nature of the prison phone industry.”).
156 See ADALIST-ESTRIN, supra note 1, at 2.
157 Reckdahl, supra note 5.
148
149
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cates have argued that the burden of coping with the pain of having a loved one
incarcerated is enough to deal with, and that families should not be saddled
with the extra problems that these phone rates bring.158 With these new rules
having been implemented, families will be more able and willing to accept
collect calls from prisons, instead of feeling like they are doing themselves an
economic disservice simply by staying in contact with their incarcerated relatives.159
2. Maintaining Relationships With Children
Children of incarcerated individuals are disadvantaged in more ways than
one.160 The Vera Institute of Justice conducted a study where it found that children with incarcerated parents suffer from “ambiguous loss,” a grieving process similar to that experienced by children with deceased parents. 161 This
problem affects over 2.7 million children nationwide.162 Sadly, many children
who have an incarcerated parent lash out in school, use drugs to cope, and often commit crimes themselves.163 In addition to that, “[l]ack of regular contact
with incarcerated parents has been linked to…homelessness, depression, [and]
aggression…in children.”164 Arguably, the aforementioned problems are exacerbated when children are not able to maintain contact with an incarcerated
parent.165 Given the fact that most inmates come from a family of low economic means, traveling to visit a parent in prison is not always a reasonable option.166 Therefore, telephone communication may be the only primary way that
children can salvage any type of consistent connection with their incarcerated
parents.167 However, if prison phone rates are too expensive for families to
afford, communication between incarcerated parents and their children will be
either inconsistent, or completely non-existent. 168 Therefore, “the ability to
Choney, supra note 31.
See RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 2.
160 See Levy-Pounds, supra note 146 (“It is not difficult to imagine that children of incarcerated parents suffer mentally, emotionally and psychologically as a result of a parent’s
incarceration.”).
161 Id.
162 Id; see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT
ON ECONOMIC
MOBILITY 18 (2010), available at http://commcns.org/1iNA4TF.
163 Levy-Pounds, supra note 146.
164 RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 2.
165 Levy-Pounds, supra note 146.
166 Id. See also Donaldson, supra note 147.
167 Levy-Pounds, supra note 146.
168 Id. (“Unfortunately, the exorbitant cost of telephone calls to and from prisons make it
difficult, and in some cases nearly impossible, to maintain contact by phone.”). See also
158
159
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have regular telephone contact could mean the difference between a child having hope or a child experiencing anguish during a parent’s incarceration. It
could also mean the difference between a child who feels loved in spite of a
parent’s incarceration and a child who feels abandoned.” 169 Therefore, the
FCC’s new rules will give each and every child a chance to reap the benefits of
remaining connected to their parents, despite them being behind bars.170
3. Reducing Recidivism Rates & Negative Prison Behaviors
The new rates will not only benefit the inmates and their families, but society at large as well.171 “High phone rates reduce incarcerated persons’ ability to
communicate with family, and family contact has been consistently shown to
lower recidivism.”172 Additionally, a 2004 Urban Institute study found that inmates who maintain close family relationships were more likely to secure employment and less likely to use drugs after release than those without such relationships, based on higher mean scores of 3.51 versus 3.34, and 3.31 versus
3.18, respectively.173 The Federal Bureau of Prisons declared that maintaining
ties to the community affects an inmate’s personal development, and an inmate’s family is an instrumental part of that development.174 In fact, the community impact and recidivism studies, which originally uncovered the correlation between family contact and inmate recidivism, were the very reason for
introducing the prison phone call system in the first place.175
Dannenberg, supra note 13.
169 Levy-Pounds, supra note 146.
170 See RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 2.
171 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 5. See also N.Y. Prisons Make Millions Profiteering
on Inmate Phone Calls, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (Dec. 6, 2006),
http://commcns.org/1ddvRVh; Brief of Amici Curiae Betsy Gotbaum, et. al in Support of
Appellants, at 4-5, Walton, et al. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. Serv., et al., 25 A.D.3d 999,
2006 WL 4070253 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 2007-0012).
172 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 1. See also Creasie Finney Hairston, Family Ties
During Imprisonment: Do They Influence Future Criminal Activity, 52 FED. PROBATION 48,
49 (1988) (positive correlation between in-prison contact and post-release success); URBAN
INSTITUTE, Returning Home: Understanding the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry, Maryland
Pilot Study, at 121 (2004), available at http://commcns.org/1gvm50k (barriers to in-prison
contact with family can have a negative effect on reentry).
173 URBAN INSTITUTE, Returning Home: Understanding the Challenges of Prisoner
Reentry, Maryland Pilot Study, at 116-19 (2004), available at http://commcns.org/1gvm50k.
See also Dannenberg, supra note 13 (“[F]amily support . . . is a strong asset . . . in the
reentry planning process.”).
174 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement No. 5264.07 ¶1
(Jan. 31, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 540.100(a) (2013)), available at
http://commcns.org/1hPriAQ; see also KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2.
175 Steven J. Jackson, Ex-Communication: Competition and Collusion in the U.S. Prison
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Acting Chairwoman Clyburn addressed this issue by commenting that
“[w]ith seven hundred thousand individuals released every year from these
institutions, it is crucial that we do whatever we can to strengthen family ties
before these individuals return home.”176 Even prison officials have expressed
disapproval when companies attempt to increase rates notwithstanding the potential for their own personal benefit through kickbacks. 177 For example, in
2002, when GTL wanted to increase rates in Tennessee, the Department of
Corrections’ Commissioner at the time explained that “maintaining contact
with family and friends in the free world is an important part of an inmate’s
rehabilitation and preparation to return to the community. . . . [Rate increases]
would hinder . . . the aforementioned departmental objectives.”178 The state of
Wisconsin is headed in the appropriate direction with regard to assisting inmates in this rehabilitation process: it has a law that requires that prison officials promote communication between an inmate and his or her support system
because doing so leads to successful reintegration.179
Reduction in recidivism rates not only benefits the public for safety reasons,
but monetary ones as well.180 Recidivism is an extremely expensive behavioral
trend, and it is the taxpayers who are responsible for footing the bill.181 Any
potential profits that will be lost as a result of lowering prison phone call rates
are far outweighed by the costs repeat offenders produce.182 Therefore, it would
Telephone Industry, NAT’L COMMC’N ASSOC., 22 CRITICAL STUDS. MEDIA COMMC’N 263,
272 (2005); Dannenberg, supra note 13.
176 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,660 (statement of Comm’r Clyburn); see Barbagallo, supra note 74.
177 See Dannenberg, supra note 13.
178 Dannenberg, supra note 13.
179 Id.
180 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,661 (statement of Comm’r Rosenworcel).
181 Id. at 16,660 (statement of Comm’r Clyburn). As one commenter noted:
Communication with families will combat recidivism, which is extremely expensive. A report by the Pew Center on the States found that
more than four in ten offenders return to state prisons within three years
of being released and reducing recidivism by just ten percent could save
the states more than $653 million in one year. While communication is
not a silver bullet, evidence shows it helps to reduce recidivism.
Id. at 16,646 n.155 (quoting the Leadership Conference); THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES,
STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 26 (Apr. 2011), available at http://commcns.org/1cx6EVT. See also KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 3 (“High
prison phone rates . . . function as a regressive tax on communities that experience higher
incarceration rates.”).
182 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 5. See also Barbagallo, supra note 74 (“The overall
costs of [not providing affordable prison phone service] are too great, for those who reoffend [represent] a substantially higher economic [taxpayer] burden than any lost proceeds
that would result . . .”).
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seem, as a matter of a simple cost-benefit analysis, that it is more economically
efficient to have lowered the rates.183 All in all, “[o]vercharging inmates is not
just unfair but also counterproductive, because it discourages inmates from
keeping in touch with a world where they will be expected to fit in.”184 The
new rules that the FCC have implemented will help decrease recidivism and its
associated costs—yet another reason why the FCC should have implemented
them.185
With regard to inmate behavior while incarcerated, Congress found that
those inmates who were able to interact with their families were less likely to
be involved in negative incidents within the prison, and were more susceptible
to having their sentences reduced.186 Moreover, maintaining connections with
family, particularly parent-child relationships, gives the inmate a “greater stake
in good behavior.”187
From a prison security standpoint, high phone rates are also associated with
See KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 3.
Costly Phone Calls for Inmates, supra note 6, at A22. See also Steven J. Jackson, ExCommunication: Competition and Collusion in the U.S. Prison Telephone Industry, NAT’L
COMMC’N ASSOC., 22 Critical Studies in Media Commc’n 263, 272 (2005) (“[A] reliable
way of increasing the likelihood that prisoners will re-offend is to break all ties with the
outside world and then place them back on the street years later, with little reentry support,
in a community to which they have become a stranger.”).
185 The ability of prisoners to affordably maintain contact with family during incarceration reduces recidivism. See KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 4 (“Lowering excessive prison
phone rates will decrease future prison costs because fewer released prisoners “will find
themselves back in prison.”).
186 Second Chance Act of 2007: Community Safety Through Recidivism Prevention, PL
110–199, § 3(b)(6), 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17501 (2008)); see also
KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2.
187 Todd Shields, Prison Phones Prove Captive Market for Private Equity, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 4, 2012), http://commcns.org/1n3YuuB. “[Parent-child] relationships are particularly
vulnerable during incarceration.” Creasie Finney Hairston, Family Ties During Imprisonment: Important to Whom and For What?, 18 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 87, 88 (1991). Incarcerated parents fear that their “relationships with [their] children [will] be irrevocably lost”
while they are in prison. Id. at 94. Maintaining parent-child communication is “vital in
maintaining parent-child attachment and enabling [parents] to maintain their parental roles
and carry out their parental responsibilities and commitments.” Id. at 91. When family ties
are maintained, benefits include not only an “increased probability of reunification of the
family household” but also overall “improved mental health of inmates” during incarceration. Id. at 87-88. As one professor suggests, “for inmates the ‘speech process’ may [consist]
of the use of language to resist or free oneself from the dehumanizing institutional identity
which a prison s[eeks] to impose. Speech [is] a mode of shedding the purely institutional
self and attaining a different character, one with links to community, however far-removed .
. . . [and] possibilities of humanizing relationships and even constructive action.” Madeleine Severin, Is there a Winning Argument Against Excessive Rates for Collect Calls from
Prisoners, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1469, 1538 (2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Brian
C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 443, 457
(1998)).
183
184
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inmates resorting to illegal means of contacting their families.188 Contraband
cell phone usage has become a widespread problem in prisons, and ironically,
“the market for cell phones behind bars is driven in part by the exorbitant rates
charged by prison phone companies; prisoners use illegal – but much more
affordable – cell phones to stay in touch with their families and friends.”189 The
new rates will therefore, in turn, lower the probability of contraband cell phone
usage in prisons as well as the accompanied security risks.190
B. Prevents Unjust Enrichment
There is a fairness argument supporting the rationalization to lower prison
phone call rates.191 Essentially, the phone companies that acquire monopolistic
contracts from state agencies and prison facilities are being unjustly enriched
as a result of “charging much higher rates than those paid by the general public.”192 Similarly, the commissions received from phone companies in return for
granting those contracts unjustly enrich the agencies.193 As discussed previously, companies and agencies facing backlash from this accusation primarily argue that “the higher rates are due to the security features their technology has,
such as monitoring phone calls and blocking numbers.”194 However, the fact
that these features are standard and so readily available to the public is in direct
opposition to the notion that they are the cause of the inflated prices.195 In fed188 See Dannenberg, supra note 13. See also Putting an End to Illegal Cell Phone Use in
Prisons, FCC Workshop/Webinar on Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons (Sept. 30,
2010), available at http://commcns.org/1jLR50t (“Contraband cell phones have been used
by inmates to arrange the murder of witnesses and public safety officers, traffic in drugs,
and manage criminal enterprises. This illegal practice jeopardizes the safety of America’s
communities and public safety officials.”).
189 Dannenberg, supra note 13.
190 RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 44.
191 See Dannenberg, supra note 13. See also Madeleine Severin, Is there a Winning Argument Against Excessive Rates for Collect Calls from Prisoners, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1469 (2004) (characterizing the prison phone call rate problem as “reach[ing] out and
goug[ing] someone”); Nationwide Research Finds Excessive Prison Phone Rates Exploit
Prisoners’ Families, NATION INSIDE, http://commcns.org/1iND2aG (last visited Mar. 9,
2013) (characterizing the prison phone call rate problem as “gross profiteering at its worst”).
192 Dannenberg, supra note 13 (Lucrative prison phone contracts profit not only the telephone companies, but the rates are further inflated to cover huge commission payments paid
to state agencies that average forty-two percent nationwide and account for $152 million in
extra annual costs paid by the families of prisoners.).
193 Id.
194 Choney, supra note 31.
195 Id. See also Ben Iddings, The Big Disconnect: Will Anyone Answer the Call to Lower
Excessive Prisoner Telephone Rates, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 159, 174-75 (2006) (suggesting
that excessive rates are driven by lucrative commissions, not operating costs which have
decreased with technological advances).
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eral prisons, not only is technology used to monitor phone calls, but the system
still makes a profit, all the while remaining affordable for consumers. 196 In
short, the commissions and inflated prices are motivated by profits on the part
of phone companies and state agencies.197 In fact, in 2001, Louisiana declared
that when deciding what company to award a contract to, the highest number
of voting points would be awarded to the bidder that proposed the highest percentage of compensation.198 Similarly, in 2007, Alaska admitted that the commission rate—also known as a “kickback”199—was the most influential factor
when considering bidders for contracts.200 These kickbacks increase the costs of
the calls, a cost borne by the consumer.201 The great expense of prison phone
calls reflects the public’s unawareness of the costs of prison, and it stems from
the state’s desire to have a source of revenue to fund other programs within the
prison.202 However, the commission payments are also used for expenses that
have nothing to do with the inmates, such as employee salaries and benefits,
renewal funds, personnel training, and states’ general revenue funds. 203 The
relatives and friends who must pay for these things, more often than not, have
limited means to begin with.204 Therefore, instead of giving phone companies
and state agencies the uninhibited discretion to set their own rates, rate caps
have been rightfully mandated, which will in turn better protect the prisoners’
familial bonds.205
Costly Phone Calls for Inmates, supra note 6, at A22.
Dannenberg, supra note 13.
198 Id.
199 Id. (commenting that “commissions” are the polite term for “kickbacks”).
200 Inmate Telephone Systems for Alaska Correctional Institutions, Alaska RFP 20082000-7549, at 1 (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://commcns.org/1ey2gUu.
201 Justin Carver, An Efficiency Analysis of Contracts for the Provision of Telephone
Services to Prisons, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 391, 398 (2002); Nationwide Research, NATION
INSIDE, supra note 191 (“Thus, prison phone companies are able to offer lower rates but for
having to pay kickbacks to the contracting government agencies.”).
202 Madeleine Severin, Note, Is There a Winning Argument Against Excessive Rates for
Collect Calls from Prisoners?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1469, 1473 (2004). See also Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147,
1224–25 (2007); Carver, supra note 201, at 399 (“States use the revenue derived from the
commissions in different ways. Most states claim to use the funds to offset costs of operating a prison, either by funding programs operated by the Department of Corrections, or by
placing the funds in a prisoners’ welfare account.”).
203 RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 53.
204 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,660 (statement of Comm’r Rosenworcel) (observing that “when a single call may cost as much as a month of unlimited phone
service, the financial burden of staying in touch may be too much for inmates’ families to
bear”).
205 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,661 (statement of Comm’r Clyburn)
(concluding that the “provisioning of affordable phone services” is the most sure way to
strengthen family ties, and that the “overall costs of not doing so are too great, for those who
196
197
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C. Addressed Arbitrariness of Rates
Prison phone rates nationwide have been described as “a patchwork of
charges that simply cannot be correlated to providing the same basic telephone
service.”206 Not only do these rates vary greatly between different states, but
within states as well.207 These extreme differences remain even when the telephone services are supplied by the same company.208 Additionally, the method
by which customers are charged for prison calls often varies.209
As an example of these variations, the Prison Policy Initiative found that the
cost for a 15-minute, interstate phone call could cost $2.36 in Massachusetts
and $17.00 in Georgia.210 Overall, most states charge a connection fee of $3.00
or more with per-minute fees of up to $0.89 for interstate calls.211 These rates
result in customers paying anywhere from $10.00 to $17.00 just to talk on the
phone for no more than 15 minutes.212 “This is a far cry from the much lower
long distance rates paid by the non-incarcerated public, which typically run
$.05 to $.10 per minute or simple flat rate monthly fees for unlimited long distance calling in the $50.00-80.00 a month range.”213 However, in polar opposire-offend place a substantially higher economic burden on taxpayers than any lost proceeds
that would result from lower prison phone rates”). Others believe that reform of the prison
phone-rates through the courts still serves as a viable approach. Ben Iddings, Comment, The
Big Disconnect: Will Anyone Answer the Call to Lower Excessive Prisoner Telephone
Rates?, 8 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 159, 163–64, 198–99 (2006) (observing that litigation “often has the ability to rally support and crystallize public opinion around an issue and
that reformers must endeavor continuously to influence public opinion).
206 Dannenberg, supra note 13. The FCC has also commented on the “wide disparity in
[prison phone rates] between states,” observing that the rates’ price variance might be attributable to kickbacks, because the rates are higher in states that require commissions.
RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,633 (The FCC echoes Dannenberg’s concerns: “Such record evidence raises questions about whether [prison phone] rates accurately
reflect the costs of providing ICS and whether site commission payments are a reasonable
cost of providing [a prison phone service] that therefore should be recovered in the . . . rates
inmates are charged.”).
207 Nationwide Research, NATION INSIDE, supra note 191.
208 Id.
209 Dannenberg, supra note 13 (For example, local calls could be free, or local calls
might have a flat-rate, a per-minute charge, or a connection fee along with a per-minute
charge.).
210 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2. See also Christine Mai-Duc, FCC Proposes
Changes to Lower Pay-Phone Rates for Prisoners, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://commcns.org/LqMJO9; Barbagallo, supra note 74 (“The FCC found that the costs for
a 15-minute interstate call were $6.65 in California, $6.45 in Texas, $2.04 in Montana, and
$16.55 in Idaho.”).
211 Dannenberg, supra note 13.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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tion to the majority, there are states such as New York, where interstate calls
cost $0.48 per minute, with no connection fee at all.214 New York’s rates are
one twenty-fifth the cost of Washington’s, the state with the highest interstate
rate.215
Local calls differ from intrastate calls in that, while still made to recipients
in the same state, they are only considered local if the recipient is in “a small
area around the call’s originating location,”—for example, calls within the
same city.216 States differ widely in the structures that they set for their localcall rates; some states implement flat rates, others impose rates that include
both a connection fee as well as a per-minute charge.217 These variations result
in costs ranging from as low as a flat $0.50 for 15 minutes in North Dakota,
South Carolina and Florida, to $6.20 in Colorado, which charges a $2.75 connection fee, as well as a $0.23 per-minute charge.218 Intrastate rates vary significantly, as well.219 For example, New York charges a mere $0.048 per-minute
fee for intrastate calls, amounting to $0.72 for a 15-minute call,220 while Oregon not only charges a $3.95 connection fee, but a $0.69 per-minute fee as
well.221 Effectively, New York callers and recipients are paying less than a
dollar to talk to their incarcerated family members for 15 minutes, but Oregon
customers are paying $14.30 to do the exact same thing.222
The costs of prison phone calls continues to diverge widely amongst jurisdictions, even when the same company provides the services, further evidencing a revenue-driven model.223 As an illustration, Rhode Island’s “no kick-back
commission low rates,” are provided by GTL, which is the same company that
charges some of the highest rates in the country in states where commissions
are paid.224 Even though GTL provides services in both states, it costs $10.70 to
place a 15-minute interstate collect call in Arkansas, while doing the same in

214 Id. (referencing table). Washington’s interstate rate for prison phone calls is $4.95
plus $0.89 per minute, while New York’s is a mere $0.48 per minute; during the course of a
fifteen-minute phone-call, the Washington rate will result in a charge of $18.30, while the
New York rate will result in a charge of $0.72.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Dannenberg, supra note 13. See also KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2 (noting that
Global Tel*Link—the prison phone company used by New York—charges the approximate
$0.05 fee for both local and long-distance calls).
222 Dannenberg, supra note 13.
223 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2.
224 Dannenberg, supra note 13.
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Rhode Island only costs $5.80.225 “It is readily apparent that the service provided, i.e., prison-based phone calls, is profitable for GTL even at the company’s
lowest rates; thus, the higher rates charged in states where GTL pays commissions amount to nothing more than price gouging and gross profiteering.”226
Unfortunately, this “kickback-based business model” is commonly used since
GTL provides services to the majority of prison facilities throughout the country.227
Phone companies have been charging customers at rates that generate revenue.228 However, the reality of that injustice was irrelevant because once there
was a contract obtained, families had no choice but to tolerate the rates even if
they seemed unfair and were inflated.229 The FCC can now put an end to companies’ ability to take advantage of customers with interstate calls by the institution of these new and improved rules.
D. New Rule Mirroring Recent Trends
Some states seem to have been one step ahead of the FCC prior to it’s new
decision.230 Several states actually voluntarily changed their own prison phone
call rates and instituted new policies.231 Eight states have already banned the
commissions that are paid by the phone companies to state contracting agencies.232 States that have banned commissions are the same states where some of
the lowest rates for prison phone calls are instituted.233 For example, “Missouri
charges [ten] cents a minute for a long-distance phone call with a one dollar
connection fee.”234 By means of comparison, after banning commissions, prison phone call rates dropped 61% in California, 87% in Michigan, and 69% in
New York.235 Although not completely eliminated, Arkansas, Kansas, and New
225

Id.
Id.
227 Id.
228 Ian Haney Lopez, Freedom, Mass Incarceration, and Racism in the Age of Obama,
62 ALA. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2011) (“States (and, with their acquiescence, private industry)
generate tremendous revenue by imposing exorbitant rates on the phone calls that prisoners
make to their families.”).
229 Dannenberg, supra note 13.
230 Id.
231 See As the FCC Deliberates, Louisiana Lowers Prison Phone Rates, NATION INSIDE,
http://commcns.org/1a2M7sV (last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
232 Choney, supra note 31. See also Dannenberg, supra note 13.
233 Choney, supra note 31 (These states include California, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.).
234 Id.
235 Nationwide Research, NATION INSIDE, supra note 191; see also Dannenberg, supra
note 13.
226
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Hampshire have reduced the commission rates used in those states while Montana, similarly, has entered into a “limited-commission contract.”236 As a result,
rates decreased 50% in Arkansas, 40% in Kansas, and 64.5% in Montana.237 In
the District of Columbia, there is a maximum rate determined by the Public
Service Commission of the District of Columbia that precludes the imposition
of any commissions or charges that result in customers paying in excess of that
rate.238
The Louisiana Public Service Commission (LaPSC) became inspired by the
efforts of the aforementioned Campaign for Prison Phone Justice and their attempts at combating against the high costs of interstate prison phone calls.239
After witnessing the FCC finally start to take these concerns seriously by issuing the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Louisiana state officials voted to lower rates by twenty-five percent.240 Foster Campbell, LaPSC’s Commissioner,
declared that it was “morally wrong” to be imposing high fees on some of the
poorest people in the state of Louisiana.241 The LaPSC faced opposition by critics arguing that lowering costs would negatively affect public safety.242 However, LaPSC found that the twenty-five percent reduction would not negatively
affect the ability to screen calls.243
As a policy matter, the FCC should feel confident in the decision to lower
prison phone call rates because states had already begun to jump on board.244
Even other government agencies, such as the Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE), moved towards lowering rates.245 ICE charges only $0.12 per
minute for nationwide calling, without charging commissions or any other additional fees.246 Clearly, there is a societal trend emerging amongst states that
points in the same direction the FCC was leaning towards prior to it’s decision.247 This, consequently, only further supports the FCC’s decision to finally
lower the prices of prison phone calls.

Nationwide Research, NATION INSIDE, supra note 191.
Id; Dannenberg, supra note 13.
238 See RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, Appendix B.
239 FCC Deliberates, NATION INSIDE, supra note 232.
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242 FCC Deliberates, NATION INSIDE, supra note 232.
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244 See id. See also Choney, supra note 31; Dannenberg, supra note 13.
245 RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 4.
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247 See FCC Deliberates, NATION INSIDE, supra note 232. See also Choney, supra note
13; Dannenberg, supra note 13.
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FORESEEABLE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

Dissenting Commissioner, Ajit Pai expressed concerns with implementing
these new rules. Although acknowledging that the problem with prison phone
call rates should have been addressed years ago, “he could not vote for the
proposal because it was too complex, and he was uncertain the commission
could enforce it.”248 Essentially, Commissioner Pai is concerned that the Order
has the potential to spark lawsuits against the FCC.249 In addition to that, the
FCC has admitted that in accordance with keeping rates “just and reasonable,”
for the benefit of both the users and service providers, the elimination of commission payments may impede certain prison facilities’ ability from implementing social welfare programs for inmates.250 In order to address and anticipate concerns, as well as ensuring that “interstate and intrastate ICS are provided consistent with the statute and public interest,” the FCC has issued a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM”). In the FNPRM, the FCC
seeks comment on reforming intrastate rates, additional issues regarding telephone services for deaf inmates, the impact of new technology on interstate
rates, the possibility of implementing quality of service standards, amongst a
variety of other issues.251
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Contracts that allow phone companies to profit from inflated rates, and state
agencies to profit from unnecessarily high commissions are socially regressive.252 These profits are often procured at the expense of economically disadvantaged families. These families are forced to decide whether to face economic hardship and pay the excessive rates, or cease contact with their loved
ones who are behind bars.253 Sadly, the profit-motives of contracting agencies
and phone companies have taken an overwhelming priority over the known
rehabilitative benefits that lowering the rates will generate.254 Decreasing recidivism rates, preventing negative prison behaviors, maintaining relationships
with children and removing the burden from innocent families are all factors
that will positively affect a far greater number of people than would the unjust

248
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250
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enrichment of a couple of telephone companies and state agencies.255 “Notably,
the only ones satisfied with the status quo are the phone companies … and corrections departments … Outside of those with a financial interest in the prison
phone industry, the consensus – ranging from concerned members of Congress
. . . to thousands of affected consumers nationwide – is for reform of exorbitant
prison phone rates.”256
As a policy matter, the rules set forth in the Order are by no means an unheard of, or inconceivable course of action.257 The movement towards lowering
prison phone call rates has already received a substantial amount of support
from advocacy organizations nationwide, and even began to manifest itself as
various states decided to change their own laws in accordance therewith. 258
Although there are several concerns and challenges that the FCC will have to
address in the near future regarding this decision, the new rules will finally
give inmates a real chance at rehabilitation, while simultaneously lifting an
economic burden off low-income families’ shoulders.259 In the words of Acting
Chairwoman Mignon Clyburn, “[i]t’s been a long time coming, and not in time
to directly benefit Mrs. Wright, but a change has finally come.”260
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